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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Amended Complaint alleges that Frank Shirts, Jr., and Ronald, Leslie and John
Shirts, d/b/a! Shirts Brothers Sheep (collectively the "Shirts and Shirts Bothers") held federal
grazing permits allowing them "to graze their sheep on certain allotments in the Payette
National Forest" in or near the Hells Canyon area, and that the "grazing permits were and are
essential to the success and viability of the Shirts' and Shirts Brothers' grazing operations."
R., p. 11.

Federal grazing permits confer upon the hoMer a "personal privilege" to graze
livestock on federal lands that is "revocable at the government's discretion." Hage v. United
States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 167 (1996). The grazing privilege is "withdrawable at any time for
any use by the sovereign without the payment of compensation," Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d
712, 719 (9th Cir. 1983), quoting Osborne v. United States, 145 F.2d 892, 896 (9th Cir.
1944), and "the cancellation of [a permit] does not give rise to damages." Hage, 35 Fed. Cl.
at 150. See R., p. 73 ("[t]he Plaintiffs do not take issue with IDFG's statement that federal
grazing permits are not contracts").
While decisions to discontinue federal grazing privileges are reserved to the
discretion of federal land managers, Idaho recognizes sheep grazing on federal lands as an
important economic activity and works with federal agencies to ensure that grazing privileges
are respected.

This policy guided Respondents State of Idaho, Idaho Fish and Game

Commission, the Idaho Department of Fish and Game and its director (collectively "IDFG")
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in carrying out a cooperative project with the United States Forest Service and other agencies
to reintroduce bighorn sheep to Hells Canyon.

In March of 1997, R.M. Richmond,

Supervisor of the Wallowa-Whitman National Forest, sent the following letter on Forest
Service letterhead to Stan Boyd, Executive Director of the Idaho Wool Growers Association:
Dear Mr. Boyd:
The effort to transplant bighorn sheep into historic habitat in Hells Canyon is
a cooperative project involving the States of Idaho, Oregon, and Washington,
The Foundation for North American Wild Sheep, the Forest Service, and the
Bureau of Land Management. The Hells Canyon Bighorn Sheep Restoration
Committee (the committee) is interested in having the support of the
woolgrowers industry for this effort to repopulate parts of Hells Canyon with
bighorn sheep.
The Committee understands the bighorns may occasionally migrate outside of
their designated range and corne into contact with domestic sheep. These
bighorns will be considered "at risk" for potential disease transmission and
death. There is also the potential for an exposed bighorn to leave the area and
spread disease to other bighorn sheep. Under these conditions, the Idaho
Department of Fish and Game, the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife,
and the Washington Department of Wildlife will assume the responsibility for
bighorn losses and further disease transmission in their respective states. The
three Departments will also take whatever action is necessary to reduce
further losses of bighorn sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic
sheep operators. The enclosed map clearly delineates the project area within
the Hells Canyon complex. Bighorns straying into currently active sheep
allotments will be considered "at risk" by all of the Committee entities. This
means that the Committee recognizes the existing domestic sheep operations
in or adjacent to the Hells Canyon complex, on both National Forest and
private lands, and accepts the potential risk of disease transmission and loss of
bighorn sheep when bighorns invade domestic sheep operations.
The Committee will make every effort to keep interested parties informed
about actions being considered by the Committee in its effort to repopulate
Hells Canyon with bighorn sheep. We will provide all health information
gathered on bighorn sheep to the wool growers industry and other interested
parties.
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R., pp. 197-98 (hereinafter "1997 Letter" or "Letter").

The Letter was also signed by

representatives of IDFG, the Oregon Department of Fish and Game, the Washington
Department of Fish and Wildlife, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Foundation for
North American Wild Sheep.}
Below, Appellants Idaho Wool Growers Association ("IWGA"), the Shirts, and Shirts
Bothers (collectively "Woolgrowers") asserted that the 1997 Letter "constitutes a contract
with IWGA and its members to indemnify the IWGA and its members from any harm or
economic loss caused by the reintroduction of the bighorn sheep into the Hells Canyon area."
R., pp. 67-68. Woolgrowers allege the 1997 Letter represents the entirety of the agreement
between IDFG and Woolgrowers. See R., p. 132 (the "Letter Agreement memorialized the
'deal' IDFG had reached with the Wool Growers: the Wool Growers would drop their
objections to the reintroduction of the bighorn sheep and in return IDFG promised that it
would protect the Wool Growers from economic harm arising from the reintroduction").
Shortly after the 1997 Letter was executed, the Idaho Legislature amended
Idaho Code § 36-106(e) by adding a new subsection, SeD), which provided that the
director of IDFG may not take action to "undertake actual transplants of bighorn
sheep into areas they do not now inhabit or to augment the number of bighorn sheep
in existing herds" until notice was given to affected boards of county commissioners,

} A copy of the 1997 Letter is reproduced as Addendum 1 to this brief. A copy of the
Letter was attached to the First Amended Complaint and incorporated into its allegations. R.,
p.12.
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land owners, and grazing permittees.

1997 Idaho Sess. Laws 863, 864-65. The

director was also required to submit a plan to legislative leaders describing the
location and numbers of bighorn sheep to be transplanted. Id. Hearings were to be
held if "any affected individual or entity expresses written concern" regarding
proposed transplants. Id. at 865. Additionally:
Upon any transplant of bighorn sheep into areas they do not now inhabit or a
transplant to augment existing populations, the department shall provide for
any affected federal or state land grazing permittees or owners or leaseholders
of private land a written letter signed by all federal, state and private entities
responsible for the transplant stating that the existing sheep or livestock
operations in the area of any such bighorn sheep transplant are recognized and
that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of bighorn
sheep when the same invade domestic livestock or sheep operations is
accepted.
Id.

The legislation included an emergency clause causing it to go into effect upon its

approval by the governor, which occurred on March 24, 1997. Id. at 867. Woolgrowers
assert that the executive director of the Idaho Wool Growers Association was listed as the
contact for the legislation. Appellants' Brief at 15.
Bighorn sheep were reintroduced into Hells Canyon, and for a number of years the
Forest Service and other signatories accepted bighorn losses that occurred. Woolgrowers
allege, however, that beginning in April 2007 "the Forest Service reneged on its commitment
in the 1997 Letter and began to modify various grazing permits in 2007, 2008, 2009, and
2010, including those of Shirts and Shirts Brothers." R., p. 13. The permit modifications
arose from an administrative appeal, in which a reviewing officer for the chief of the Forest
Service ordered the regional forester to complete a risk analysis of bighorn sheep viability.
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Western Watersheds Project v.

u.s.

Forest Service, 2007 WL 1430734 at *2 (D. Idaho

2007). The analysis concluded there was a high risk of disease transmission from domestic
sheep to bighorn sheep. Id. Western Watersheds Project then brought an action in federal
court seeking to enjoin sheep grazing on six allotments held by the Shirts and Shirts Brothers.
The Forest Service responded by agreeing to impose grazing restrictions on most of the
allotments. Id. at * 1. The Forest Service eventually modified several additional allotments
grazed by the Shirts or Shirts Bothers. See,

~.,

Western Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest

Service, 2007 WL 1729734 (D. Idaho 2007) (denying motion to enjoin modifications);
Western Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest Service, 2007 WL 3407679 at *4 (D. Idaho 2007)
(declining to stay modifications).
The Forest Service's modification of the Shirts' and Shirts Brothers' grazing permits
prompted the Idaho legislature to amend Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5) to reiterate that it "is the
policy of the state of Idaho that existing sheep or livestock operations in the area of any
bighorn sheep transplant or relocation are recognized and that the potential risk, if any, of
disease transmission and loss of bighorn sheep when the same invade domestic livestock or
sheep operations is accepted." 2009 Idaho Sess. Laws 913,915. The legislature added a new
subsection to § 36-106(e)(5) requiring IDFG to work with federal grazing permittees to
develop best management practices for each grazing allotment and certify that with such
practices in place the risk of disease transmission was acceptable:
(E) The Idaho department of fish and game: (1) shall develop a state
management plan to maintain a viable, self-sustaining population of bighorn
sheep in Idaho which shall consider as part of the plan the current federal or
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state domestic sheep grazing allotment(s) that currently have any bighorn
sheep upon or in proximity to the allotment(s); (2) within ninety (90) days of
the effective date of this act will' cooperatively develop best management
practices with the permittee(s) on the allotment(s). Upon commencement of
the implementation of best management practices, the director shall certify
that the risk of disease transmission, if any, between bighorn and domestic
sheep is acceptable for the viability of the bighorn sheep. The director's
certification shall continue for as long as the best management practices are
implemented. The director may also certify that the risk of disease
transmission, if any, between bighorn and domestic sheep is acceptable for the
viability of the bighorn sheep based upon a finding that other factors exist,
including but not limited to previous exposure to pathogens that make
separation between bighorn and domestic sheep unnecessary.
2009 Idaho Sess. Laws at 915-16. The legislative history indicates that the amendment was
"negotiated and agreed upon by the Governor's office, the Senate, and the Shirts family's
attorney," and was intended to address "grazing on the Payette National Forest lands." R.,
pp. 113-14 (House Res. & Cons. Comm. Minutes, April 29, 2009)?
The Amended Complaint does not allege that IDFG failed to comply with the
amended terms of Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5) to develop best management practices and
certify to federal agencies that the risk of disease transmission is acceptable.

Instead,

Woolgrowers allege generally that IDFG "took no action to block the Forest Service from

2 The legislative history was provided to the district court pursuant to this Court's
holding that in deciding a motion to dismiss under IRCP 12(b)(6), the facts appearing on the
face of the complaint may be "supplemented by such facts as the court may properly
judicially notice." Independent School Dist. of Boise City v. Harris Family Ltd. Partnership,
150 Idaho 583, 588, 249 P.3d 382, 387 (2011), quoting Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826,
833,243 P.3d 642,649 (2010). Courts may take "judicial notice of public and private acts of
the legislature and the journals of the legislative bodies for the purpose of ascertaining what
was done by the legislature." Idaho State Tax Comm'n v. Haener Bros., Inc., 121 Idaho 741,
743,828 P.2d 304,306 (1992), quoting Knight v. Employment Sec. Agency, 88 Idaho 262,
266,398 P.2d 643,645 (1965).
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modifying the grazing allotments for Shirts and Shirts Brothers and took insufficient action
to prevent Shirts and Shirts Brother from being harmed from these decisions," and further
alleged that as "the result of the prior and continuing grazing permit modifications, IWGA,
Shirts, and Shirts Brothers have suffered significant economic losses and will continue to
suffer economic losses." R., p. 14. In argument, however, Woolgrowers "concede[d] that
IDFG probably has no legal power to block the United States Forest Service from modifying
federal grazing permits," and "concede[ d] that if their claim against IDFG were solely that
IDFG failed to 'block' the Forest Service from modifying the Shirts' grazing permits then
their Complaint can and should be dismissed." R., p. 67. Given this concession, the sole
basis for Woolgrower's claim against IDFG was the allegation that "IDFG took insufficient
action to prevent Shirts and Shirts Brothers from being harmed from [the Forest Service's]
decisions." R., p. 14 (Amended Complaint).
The Amended Complaint did not define the type of action that would have been
deemed sufficient by Woolgrowers to prevent harm, but in argument to the district court they
asserted that IDFG was obligated to "protect and indemnify Plaintiffs" from loss of federal
grazing privileges by "providing alternative sources of feed; providing alternative grazing
lands; or providing monetary compensation for economic losses suffered by Plaintiffs." R.,
p. 69. Woolgrowers later conceded, however, "that they are not pursuing an action for
specific performance or some alternative means of mitigating the alleged damages caused to
[Woolgrowers] by the [Forest Service] actions," but instead were only seeking "monetary
indemnification from the IDFG for the act of the [Forest Service] reducing the Plaintiffs'
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grazmg allotment."

R., p. 183.

In Woolgrowers' words, "IDFG through its Letter

Agreement and the State through enactment of the 1997 statute ... guaranteed that the Wool
Growers members would be indemnified for any economic loss they suffered because of the
reintroduction of the bighorns." R., p. 69. In short, Woolgrowers assert that IDFG assumed
financial liability for all economic losses suffered by Woolgrowers even if the losses were
caused by decisions of federal agencies outside IDFG's control. See Appellants' Brief at 10
("nowhere in the four comers of the Letter Agreement is it suggested that 'the Department
[will only] be responsible for their own acts"') (quoting district court memorandum
decision).
The district court, after noting Woolgrowers' acknowledgment "that IDFG could not
prevent the [Forest Service] from modifying the grazing permits," characterized the claim as
"essentially an action for monetary indemnification from the IDFG for the act of the [Forest
Service] reducing the Plaintiffs' grazing allotment." R., pp. 182-83. The court concluded
that the claim for indemnification should be dismissed since the plain language of the 1997
Letter "does not specifically state or imply that the Departments will pay money damages to
the IWGA for any loss of grazing rights caused by the [Forest Service] or for any other act of
the Departments." R., p. 183. The district court also concluded that any attempt to create
such liability would be void for violation of Idaho Code § 59-1015, which prohibits
contractual creation of indebtedness without proper appropriation. R., p. 183.
With regard to the claims based on Idaho Code § 36-106, the district court found the
statute to be unambiguous, and that "nothing in the words of the statute suggests that the
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legislature intended to obligate the State or the IDFG to pay damages or indemnify the
Plaintiff for any economic loss related to the described activities, let alone an economic loss
occasioned by the act of a Federal agency." R, p. 187.
The Court concluded that the Woolgrowers' claims of estoppel also failed since
"[t]here is nothing set forth in the letter to suggest that the IDFG was representing or
committing to indemnify the Plaintiff or otherwise pay damages to the Plaintiff for the loss of
grazing privileges as a result of the independent acts of the [Forest Service]" and because of
principles generally precluding the invocation of estoppel against governments carrying out
sovereign or governmental duties. R, p. 193-94. Judgment was entered dismissing all
counts in the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). R, pp. 199-200.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Idaho Code § 12-117(1) requires the award of attorney fees and other reasonable
expenses in any "civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or
political subdivision and a person" if the court "finds that the nonprevailing party acted
without a reasonable basis in fact or law."
F or the reasons explained in the argument section of this brief, Appellants continue to
assert claims that not only lack a reasonable factual or legal basis, but are directly contrary to
the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint. Arguments asserting the assumption of certain
financial obligations by IDFG are constructed out of whole cloth that bear no relation to the
actual language of the statute and alleged contract upon which the claims are based. See,
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Mareci v. Coeur d'Alene School Dist. No. 271, 150 Idaho 740, 744-45, 250 PJd 791, 795-96
(Idaho 2011) (awarding attorney fees on appeal where appellant made arguments without
supporting authority and "contrary to the clear and unambiguous wording of the statute").
Moreover, much of Woolgrowers' argument on appeal is taken, often verbatim, from
arguments presented unsuccessfully to the district court. An award of attorney fees pursuant
to Idaho Code § 12-117 is appropriate when the appellant "continue [s] to rely on the same
arguments used in front of the district court, without providing any additional persuasive law
or bringing into doubt the existing law on which the district court based its decision" or
"fail[s] to add any new analysis or authority to the issues raised below."

Castrigno v.

McQuade, 141 Idaho 93,98, 106 P.3d 419, 424 (2005).
ARGUMENT

Woolgrowers assert that by alleging "an agreement, consideration, breach of the
agreement and resulting damages" they have done "all that is necessary" to avoid dismissaL
Appellants' Brief at 8. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("LR.C.P."), however, require a
"short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
LR.C.P. 8(a) (emphasis added). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged."

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)?

3 The cited Supreme Court rulings were interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which is
identical to subsection (2) ofLR.C.P. 8(a)(1). In applying the LR.C.P., Idaho courts refer to
authorities construing identical federal rules for guidance. Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674,
678,201 P.3d 647,651 (2009).
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',[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not pennit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not 'show[n] '-'that the
pleader is entitled to relief.'"

Id. at 1950 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

Here, the

Amended Complaint sets forth a series of conclusory statements characterizing what is
facially a letter as an extraordinary and unprecedented agreement to use public funds to
indemnify Woolgrowers from economic harm.

Such bare allegations do not fulfill the

pleading requirements of I.R.C.P. 8(a), particularly where the asserted legal conclusions are
inconsistent with the pleaded facts. "[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice." Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. "[O]n a motion to dismiss, courts 'are not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'"

Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,286 (1986).
Once the Woolgrowers' legal conclusions are disregarded, it is obvious that the facts
set forth in the Amended Complaint do not show that IDFG agreed to indemnify the
Plaintiffs against economic loss, particularly losses caused solely by the actions of a third
party outside the control of IDFG. Quite the contrary: for the reasons stated below, the facts
as set forth in the Amended Complaint compel the conclusion that no matter what additional
evidence Woolgrowers may offer, there is no legally enforceable contractual, equitable, or
statutory claim for indemnification of economic losses suffered by Woolgrowers.
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A.

The Facts Pleaded in the Amended Complaint Fail to Show the Existence of an
Enforceable Contract between IDFG and Woolgrowers.
The district court did not resolve the issue of whether the Amended Complaint

adequately shows an "agreement" between IDFG and Woolgrowers because in its motion to
dismiss IDFG argued that even if the 1997 Letter is assumed to be an "agreement" the
Amended Complaint still fails to state a claim, because: (1) if construed to be an agreement
the Letter did not set forth an obligation to indemnify Woolgrowers from economic losses;
and (2) if construed to be an indemnity agreement the Letter would be contrary to public
policy and void ab initio. Before this Court, however, Woolgrowers assert that the Amended
Complaint adequately "alleges an agreement, consideration, breach of the agreement and
resulting damages." Appellants' Brief at 8. While IDFG maintains that the dismissal can be
upheld without determining the status of the Letter, it nonetheless responds to Woolgrowers'
assertions.
1.

On its face, the 1997 Letter is nothing more than the type of letter commonly

sent by agencies to interest groups that may be affected by agency actions-it explains what
actions the agency plans to take and expresses interest in having the interest group's support
for the agency's efforts. The Letter states that the Committee "is interested in having the
support of the woolgrowers industry for this effort to repopulate parts of Hells Canyon with
bighorn sheep." R., p. 197. It then states the Committee accepts the potential risk of disease
transmission and bighorn losses and states that wildlife managers will "take whatever action
is necessary to reduce further losses of bighorn sheep without adversely impacting existing
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domestic sheep operators." R., p. 197. There is nothing on the face of the Letter that
constitutes an offer to enter into a contract. "An offer is a manifestation of willingness to
enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to
that bargain is invited and will conclude it." Intermountain Forest Management, Inc. v.
Louisiana Pacific Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 237, 31 P.3d 921, 925 (2001) quoting Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 24. None of the actions described in the Letter are conditioned upon
IWGA's provision of political support. See Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 913, 204 P.3d
1114, 1124 (2009) (unilateral contract exists only if "the offeror makes a promise that is
conditional on the offeree's acceptance").
Thus, the Letter lacks the most fundamental aspect of a contract: the existence of a
bargain. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states: "It is essential to a bargain that each
party manifest assent with reference to the manifestation of the other." Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 23 (1981). Here, the Letter is the opposite of a bargain-while IWGA's
political support was obviously desired, the Letter manifests the Committee's intent to carry
out the specified actions regardless of whether IWGA supported reintroduction. Given the
lack of any indication that the actions to be taken by the signatory agencies were dependent
on the manifestation of IWGA's assent to the bighorn sheep reintroduction program, the
Amended Complaint fails to set forth facts showing the existence of a contract.
2.

Given the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, the element of

consideration is also lacking. Woolgrowers argue that in consideration for IDFG's agreement
to protect domestic sheep operations from economic harm Woolgrowers "withdrew their
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opposition to the reintroduction of the bighorn sheep and ceased legislative action to prohibit
IDFG from participating in the program." Appellants' Brief at 3. In short, Wool growers
allege that "the consideration for the contract was [IWGA's] forbearance from opposing the
reintroduction." Id. at 8.
A promise to forebear from lobbying for or against legislation has not been
recognized as consideration under Idaho law. "Forbearance to exercise a right against either
a promisor or a third person is sufficient consideration for a contract." McColm-Traska v.
Valley View, Inc., 138 Idaho 497, 501, 65 P.3d 519, 523 (2003) (emphasis added), quoting
Walter E. Wilhite Revocable Living Trust v. Northwest Yearly Meeting Pension Fund, 128
Idaho 539, 546, 916 P.2d 1264, 1271 (1996). The right surrendered, however, must be a
legally recognizable claim or defense that is "not doubtful because of uncertainty as to the
facts or the law."

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 74 (1981).

Cases recognizing

forbearance as consideration typically involve forbearance of legal claims based on contract
or statute. See, M,., McColm-Traska, 138 Idaho at 502, 65 P.3d at 524 (promise to not
pursue negligence claim); Walter E. Wilhite Revocable Living Trust, 128 Idaho at 547, 916
at 1272 (promise to not pursue foreclosure on property or payment of note); Eastern Idaho
Production Credit Ass'n v. Placerton, Inc., 100 Idaho 863, 867, 606 P.2d 967, 971 (1980)
(promise to not sue on matured contract right).
Other courts have suggested that a promise to not lobby the legislature in opposition
to a proposed agency action is not adequate consideration for an alleged contract.

In

Northrop Grumman Corp. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 622 (2000), the plaintiff alleged that
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NASA had agreed to re-structure space-station development contracts with plaintiffs and
three other contractors in a manner that preserved much of the contract work that plaintiff
would have received absent such restructuring. Plaintiff argued that "its consideration for the
contract with NASA was agreeing to forebear lobbying Congress in opposition to the
restructured Space Station Program." Id. at 625. The court held "[a] decision to forbear
bringing a meritorious claim may create valid consideration [bJut we are not aware of
authority supporting the notion that agreeing not to lobby Congress is a benefit to the
Government." Id.
Likewise, this Court should reject Wool growers' assertion that forbearance of
anticipated lobbying efforts constitutes valid consideration for the alleged agreement. IWGA
did not forbear a legally cognizable claim, but forbore only its plan to engage in political
lobbying. Not only is such forbearance fraught with uncertainty as to how the legislature
may react, but "[s]uch an agreement could raise public policy concerns if it were valuable
consideration." Id. at 625 n.2. Neither the Idaho Fish and Game Commission nor the IDFG
director are authorized to use IDFG funds to pay private organizations to lobby for or against
legislation. See generally Idaho Code §§ 36-104, 36-106.
B.

The Amended Complaint Fails to Plead Any Facts Showing that IDFG Agreed
to Indemnify Sheep Operators from Economic Harm in the Event the Forest
Service Acted to Modify Grazing Permits.
It is ultimately unnecessary to determine the status of the 1997 Letter to uphold

dismissal of the Amended Complaint. Assuming for purposes of argument that the 1997
Letter is a contract, Woolgrowers' assertion that the 1997 Letter commits IDFG to protect
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Woolgrowers from economic harm arising from modification of grazing privileges is directly
contrary to the alleged facts.
Agreements to indemnify or protect another party from economic losses caused by
the action of a third party must be stated unequivocally. "The language imposing indemnity
must be clear, unequivocal, and certain [and] the losses to be indemnified must be clearly
stated and the intent of the indemnitor's obligation to indemnify against them must be
expressed in clear and unequivocal terms and to such an extent that no other meaning can be
ascribed." 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indemnity § 7 (2010); R.W. Beck and Associates, Inc. v. Job Line
Const., Inc., 122 Idaho 92, 96, 831 P.2d 560, 564 (Ct. App. 1992) ("[t]he obligation to
indemnify is to be strictly construed, and the status of indemnitee is also interpreted
narrowly").
Here, the Amended Complaint fails to adequately allege an agreement to indemnify
Wool growers from economic losses in the event the Forest Service modified their grazing
permits.

First, no language typical of indemnification is present, such as "indemnify,"

"save," or "hold harmless." There is in fact a complete absence of any terms indicating that
IDFG assumed liability for Woolgrowers' economic losses. The only language touching
upon liability is the provision by which all signatories agreed to "recognize" existing
domestic sheep operations and accept the risk of disease transmission and loss of bighorn
sheep. The plain meaning of "recognize" is to "show acceptance of the validity" of an
instrument, status or action. American Heritage Dictionary 1460 (4th ed. 2000); see also
Black's Law Dictionary 1277 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "recognition" as "[c]onfirmation that
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an act done by another person was authorized"). A statement of intent to "accept the risk" is
generally construed as a waiver or release of potential liability. See Restatement (Second) of
Tort § 496B (1965) ("[a] plaintiff who by contract or otherwise expressly agrees to accept a
risk of harm arising from the defendant's negligent or reckless conduct cannot recover for
such harm").

Under the plain terms of the 1997 Letter, the only risk assumed by the

signatories was the risk that bighorn sheep may be lost. There is no statement accepting or
transferring the risk that grazing rights may be modified.
The signatories' willingness to accept the risk of bighorn losses cannot be
transformed by rules of construction into an agreement to indemnify Wool growers for
economic losses.

Perhaps for that reason, Woolgrowers assert that the obligation to

indemnify Woolgrowers for economic losses rests solely the Letter's statement that IDFG
and the other state wildlife management agencies would "take whatever action is necessary
to reduce further losses of bighorn sheep without adversely impacting existing domestic
sheep operators." Appellants' Brief at 1O.
The Amended Complaint alleges that the "intent" of the quoted language was that
IDFG "would take whatever action was necessary so that Idaho domestic sheep operations
and operators would not be harmed as a result of the reintroduction of Bighorn Sheep in
Hells Canyon." R, p. 5. This bald legal conclusion, however, is not supported by the facts
in the Amended Complaint. The 1997 Letter recites that bighorn sheep migrating outside
their designated range may contact domestic sheep, become diseased, then "leave the area
and spread disease to other bighorn sheep." R., p. 197. The letter then states that "under
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these conditions" IDFG will "assume the responsibility for bighorn losses" and take whatever
action is necessary to reduce "further losses" of bighorn sheep. Id.
The district court correctly concluded that, in context, the proviso that IDFG would
avoid "adversely impacting" domestic sheep operations modifies and restricts only the
statement that IDFG would take "whatever action is necessary to reduce further losses of
bighorn sheep." R., p. 181. Even with all inferences made in favor of Woolgrowers, the
Amended Complaint fails to show that IDFG obligated itself to take whatever actions are
necessary to mitigate or indemnifY Woolgrowers' economic losses in the event the Forest
Service modified their grazing permits. This is particularly true given the allegation that the
Forest Service, by modifYing grazing permits, reneged on promises made in the Letter. R., p.
13. Any commitment by IDFG to avoid adverse impacts on domestic sheep operators while
taking action to reduce bighorn losses was made in conjunction with the Forest Service's
promise to accept the risk that bighorn sheep may be lost. Nothing in the 1997 Letter
obligates IDFG to assume financial responsibility for actions of other signatories alleged to
be inconsistent with the terms of the Letter.
C.

Any Agreement by IDFG to Use Public Funds to Indemnify Woolgrowers from
Economic Harm Would be Illegal and Hence Void as a Matter of Law.
Even if the Amended Complaint adequately alleged the existence of an agreement by

IDFG to indemnifY Wool growers from economic losses, the Amended Complaint must still
be dismissed for failure to state a claim, for such an agreement would be void as a matter of
law. See,

~

Davis & Associates, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 501 F. Supp. 2d 77, 80-81
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(D.D.C. 2007) (dismissing action for failure to state a claim when underlying government
contracts were void ab initio for violation of statute prohibiting contracts for future payments
in excess of existing appropriations).
1.

A fundamental principle of administrative law is that an agency cannot act

outside its statutory authority. See Idaho Code § 67-5279 (agency actions to be set aside if
"in excess of the statutory authority of the agency"); Yaden v. Gem Irr. Dist., 37 Idaho 300,
310, 216 P. 250, 253 (1923) ("a contract made with a public officer in excess of the
provisions of the statute authorizing the contract is void, so far as it departs from or exceeds
the terms of the law"); see also Air Quality Products, Inc. v. State of California, 157
Cal. Rptr. 791, 796 (Cal. App. 1979) ("no contractual obligation may be enforced against a
public agency unless it appears the agency was authorized by the Constitution or statute to
incur the obligation; a contract entered into by a governmental entity without the requisite
constitutional or statutory authority is void and unenforceable").
Standing alone, the lack of any statutory provision authorizing IDFG to indemnify
private sheep operators from loss of federal grazing permits is sufficient to uphold dismissal.
Here, however, the contract alleged in the Amended Complaint not only lacks statutory
authority, it is explicitly prohibited and void. Idaho Code § 59-1015 provides that no state
officer or agency:
[S]hall enter, or attempt to offer to enter into any contract or agreement
creating any expense, or incurring any liability, moral, legal or otherwise, or at
all, in excess of the appropriation made by law for the specific purpose or
purposes for which such expenditure is to be made, or liability incurred,
except in the case of insurrection, epidemic, invasion, riots, floods or fires.
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Idaho Code § 59-1016 provides that any contract attempting to create indebtedness "in
violation of the provisions of this chapter, or any indebtedness created against the state in
excess of the appropriation provided for in any act, shall be void." Both statutes implement
the provisions of Article 7, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, which prohibits the withdrawal of
money from the state treasury "but in pursuance of appropriations made by law." Generally,
an appropriation requires "authority from the Legislature expressly given in legal form, to the
proper officers, to pay from the public moneys a specified sum, and no more, for a specified
purpose, and no other." Herrick v. Gallet, 35 Idaho 13, 17,204 P. 477,478 (1922). The one
exception is when money is paid from a special fund or revolving fund dedicated to a
particular purpose; in such circumstances it is not necessary to appropriate a specific sum,
and continuing appropriations may be made. Leonardson v. Moon, 92 Idaho 796, 804, 453
P.2d 542, 550 (1969); Nelson v. Marshall, 94 Idaho 726, 732-33,497 P.2d 47,53-54 (1972)
(holding constitutional continuing appropriation from water resource board revolving
development fund). Regardless of whether an appropriation is annual or continuous, money
can only be expended in accordance with purposes specified by the legislature in the
applicable appropriation act. Leonardson, 92 Idaho at 804-05, 453 P .2d at 550-51.
Below, the district court concluded that if the 1997 Letter was a contract it would be
"void as a matter of law because it would have been an attempt to create indebtedness
without proper appropriation." R., p. 183. The district court's conclusion should be upheld
because if can be determined as a matter of law that no appropriations have been made to
cover the indebtedness that IDFG is alleged to have created in the 1997 Letter.
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2.

Woolgrowers first assert that "in this early stage of litigation ... there is no

proof' that the 1996 or 1997 legislatures did not appropriate money to cover the claims
asserted by Woolgrowers in 2010. Appellants' Brief at 12. Such proof, however, is readily
available in the Idaho Session Laws, which establish that all money appropriated by the
Legislature to IDFG in 1996 and 1997 was only available for expenditure in the immediately
following fiscal years.

See Idaho Code § 67-3509 (appropriations are "available for

expenditure ... from the first day of July of the year during which such appropriation is
made to and including the thirtieth day of June of the year following").

The IDFG

appropriation bill for 1996 appropriated specified amounts to IDFG "to be expended for the
designated programs ... from the listed funds for the period July 1, 1996, through June 30,
1997." 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws 473. Likewise, the 1997 appropriation bill provided that all
appropriated funds were to be expended "from the listed funds for the period July 1, 1997,
through June 30, 1998." 1997 Idaho Sess. Laws 867, 868.
The plain language of the 1996 and 1997 appropriation acts establishes, as a matter of
law, that no money was appropriated in either 1996 nor 1997 to pay the indemnity obligation
alleged by Wool growers, which did not accrue until 2007 at the earliest. The appropriations
specified in an annual appropriations act "mark the limit of expenditure" allowed to the
agency. State v. Taylor, 58 Idaho 656, 667, 78 P.2d 125, 130 (1938). This is true even if the
annual appropriation is from a special fund otherwise subject to continuous appropriationthe more particular statute prevails. Id. "Appropriation acts when passed by the legislature
of the state of Idaho ... whether the appropriation is fixed or continuing, are fixed budgets
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beyond which state officers, departments, bureaus and institutions may not expend." Idaho
Code § 67-3516. Thus, even if the purposes specified in the 1996 and 1997 appropriation
acts were broad enough to cover the indemnity obligation alleged by Woolgrowers, the plain
language of the 1996 and 1997 appropriation acts prohibit payment of such expenditure after
the immediately following fiscal year.
In order to incur a contractual obligation that would be paid after expiration of the
annual appropriation, the Idaho Code requires that the funds be encumbered using the
procedures provided in Idaho Code § 67-3521(2). Any contractual obligation encumbered
for payment in a future year, however, "must be adequately covered by appropriated funds
from the current fiscal year." Idaho Code § 67-3521(2). Even then, encumbered funds can
only be retained for one year before "revert[ing] to the fund from which encumbered," absent
extension by the administrator of the division of financial management. Idaho Code § 673521(3). Here, the alleged obligations to domestic sheep operators did not accrue until 2007
at the earliest, a period of ten years after the 1997 appropriation. Even if money could be
encumbered for a period of ten years, funds can be encumbered only by identifying the
specific amount payable under the contract.

Idaho Code § 67-3521(2).

There are no

procedures for encumbering unliquidated obligations. Therefore, it is established as a matter
of law that if IDFG had assumed in 1997 an unliquidated obligation to reimburse domestic
sheep operators for economic losses occurring in 2007, such an obligation was not covered
by appropriations made to IDFG in 1996 or 1997 and is therefore void.
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3.

Woolgrowers next attempt to avoid the restrictions ofIdaho Code §§ 59-1015

and 59-1016 by asserting that there was no need for the "1996-1997 Legislature [to] have
appropriated money at that time," since neither IDFG nor the Legislature had any "way to
know" whether damages would occur "or the extent of those damages." Appellant's Brief at
13. If anything, Woolgrowers' argument proves the point: the very purpose of Idaho Code
§ 59-1015 is to prohibit agencies from contractually obligating the state to pay unliquidated

sums of money that may exceed funds available in future years. For that reason this Court, in
applying the predecessors to §§ 59-1015 and 59-1016, has held that the "prohibitions of the
statutes and the Constitution against creating any expense or incurring any liability against
the state, in excess of existing appropriations therefor, apply to the time of incurring the
expense or liability rather than to the time the particular bill or claim is presented for
payment." State ex reI. Hansen v. Parsons, 57 Idaho 775, 790, 69 P.2d 788, 794 (1937).4 In
short, unless there was an annual or continuing appropriation in place in 1997 to cover the
obligation alleged by Woolgrowers, the alleged obligation is void ab initio.
Likewise, this Court must reject Woolgrowers' suggestion that it is "premature and
unnecessary at this stage" to determine whether the 1997 Letter obligated funds without an
appropriation because the legislature "could appropriate monies in the next session if the

4 The Court was interpreting predecessor statutes, §§ 57-1015 and 57-1016, that
were, except for numbering, identical to the current versions ofIdaho Code §§ 59-1015 and
59-1016. State ex reI. Hansen was partially overruled, on other grounds, in State ex reI.
Williams v. Musgrave, 84 Idaho 77, 87, 370 P.2d 778, 784 (1982) (holding that money in
state insurance fund does not belong to state and is not subject to art. 7, § 13, of the
Constitution).
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agreement were found to be valid." Appellants' Brief at 14. The legislature cannot ratify
agreements made in violation of Idaho Code § 59-1015 by appropriating money at a later
date. The Idaho Constitution, Article III, § 19, prohibits any "local or special laws ...
[l]egalizing as against the state the unauthorized act or invalid act of any officer." This Court
has held that if a claim is incurred in violation of § 56-1015 or Article VII, § 13 of the
Constitution, "any subsequent attempt of the Legislature to pay [the claim] was
unconstitutional." State ex reI. Hansen, 57 Idaho at 788,69 P.2d at 793.
4.

Wool growers next assert that Idaho Code § 59-1015 would be inapplicable if

IDFG has "special custodial funds" that "are not subject to appropriation," and suggests one
such fund may be Idaho Code § 36-408(5)(b, which authorizes IDFG to sell a bighorn sheep
tag by lottery and use the money "in solving problems between bighorn sheep and domestic
sheep." Appellants' Brief at 12-13. Woolgrowers assert that § 36-408(5)(b) may authorize
IDFG to raise money "to protect the Woolgrowers without taking funds from the State
Treasury." Appellants' Brief at 13. Woolgrowers' argument, however, ignores the statutory
directive requiring the bighorn sheep lottery proceeds to be deposited in the fish and game
expendable trust account. Idaho Code § 36-408(5)(b). In tum, the statute authorizing the
fish and game expendable trust account requires that moneys are to be appropriated to the
fish and game commission before expenditure-absent an annual appropriation, money in the
account can only be "invested by the state treasurer in the manner provided for investment of
idle state moneys." Idaho Code § 36-108. Therefore, while such money can be used to solve
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problems between bighorn sheep and domestic sheep, IDFG is prohibited by the terms of
Idaho Code § 59-1015 from contractually obligating such money without an appropriation. 5
Likewise, Woolgrowers err in asserting that other special funds established for IDFG
may not be subject to appropriation. Because IDFG is financed primarily through the sale of
licenses and federal funding, most IDFG funds are special or dedicated funds. Nonetheless,
with one exception, all IDFG funds are appropriated by the legislature to IDFG by means of
annual appropriation acts. The fish and game fund, consisting of money from licenses, tags,
and permits, is "appropriated in the state treasury," Idaho Code § 36-107, and the expenditure
allowed from the fund is established in annual appropriation acts.

See,~,

1996 Idaho Sess.

Laws 473 (establishing appropriations from fish and game fund and other specified funds for
fiscal year 1997). The fish and game federal account, consisting of "moneys received from
the federal government for the administration of any aspect of the fish and game laws of this
state," is "subject to appropriation." Idaho Code § 36-110. The same is true for the fish and
game nonexpendable trust account, Idaho Code § 36-109; the fish and game set-aside
account and feeding account, Idaho Code § 36-111; the animal damage control fund, Idaho
Code § 36-112, and the expendable big game depredation fund, Idaho Code § 36-115.
The only IDFG revolving fund subject to a continuous appropriation is the wildlife
restoration project fund, Idaho Code § 36-1805. Money in the fund comes primarily from
"grants-in-aid" provided by the federal government to IDFG under the terms of the Wildlife
5 When the 1997 Letter was executed, Idaho Code § 36-408 provided that money from bighorn sheep
lottery tags was to be deposited into a dedicated "bighorn sheep account" to be used to resolve problems with
domestic sheep, but, as in the present statute, such money was only to "be expended pursuant to appropriation."
1991 Idaho Sess. Laws 342,343.
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Restoration Projects Act. Idaho Code § 36-1805. By federal law, money in the wildlife
restoration project fund is limited to restoring "areas of land or water adaptable as feeding,
resting, or breeding places for wildlife and fish" and related research and incidental expenses.
Idaho Code § 36-1804; see also 16 U.S.C. § 669a(8) (limiting purposes for which federal
grants in revolving fund may be used). Thus, money in the wildlife restoration project fund
could not be used to pay Woolgrowers for their economic losses.
5.

Woolgrowers make a final attempt to avoid the prohibitions of Idaho Code

§ 59-1015 by noting that it includes an exception allowing expenditures without

appropriation for certain emergencies, including epidemics. The exception in § 59-1015 for
expenditures to address "epidemics" and other emergencies must be interpreted in pari

materia with the statute governing declarations of emergency, which requires the "duly
proclaimed existence of extreme peril to the safety of persons and property within the State
... caused by such conditions as ... epidemic," Idaho Code § 46-601(1). Woolgrowers'
economic losses arising from modification of federal grazing permits do not pose a situation
of "extreme peril" justifying the expenditure of public money without appropriation.
6.

In sum, at the time IDFG signed the 1997 Letter, there was no appropriation

of funds to pay the future and unliquidated liabilities allegedly assumed by IDFG. Even if
Plaintiffs were successful in proving that the 1997 Letter was intended to function as an
indemnification agreement, such agreement is unenforceable since it would be void under the
terms of Idaho Constitution Article VII, § 13 and Idaho Code §§ 59-1015 and 59-1016.
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Thus, there is no set of facts under which Plaintiffs may prevail, and the district court
correctly dismissed all claims based on the 1997 Letter.
Such dismissal does not, as Woolgrowers allege, raise constitutional concerns
regarding impairment of contracts or deprivation of property without due process.
Impairment of contracts occurs only when the contractual obligations alleged to have been
impaired were in existence at the time the disputed law is enacted. Lindstrom v. Dist. Bd. of
Health, 109 Idaho 956, 961, 712 P.2d 657, 662 (Ct. App. 1985). Here, the provisions of
Idaho Constitution Article VII, § 13 and Idaho Code §§ 59-1015 and 59-1016 predate the
1997 Letter by decades, so that even if the Letter were intended to be a contract it was void

ab initio, and no impairment of contract or violation of due process occurred.

D.

The Amended Complaint Fails to Show that IDFG Should be Estopped from
Denying the Alleged Obligation to Indemnify Woolgrowers.
Woolgrowers' assertion that the Amended Complaint sets out the elements for

applying estoppel to the alleged promises in the 1997 Letter must be rejected based on two
fundamental legal principles. First, estoppel is not generally applicable to state agencies
acting in a sovereign or governmental capacity. Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Water
Resources, 138 Idaho 831, 845,70 P.3d 669, 683 (2003). Nor can estoppel be applied in
detriment of state obligations to protect property held in trust for the public. State v. Taylor,
44 Idaho 353, 359, 256 P. 953, 955 (1927).
Woolgrowers' suggestion that the reintroduction of bighorn sheep was carried out for
commercial or proprietary purposes is unfounded. In Idaho, the "state's control over fish and
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game within its limits ... is within the police power of the Legislature" and the "'wild game
and fish within a state belong to the people in their collective sovereign capacity.'"
Sherwood v. Stephens, 13 Idaho 399, 403, 90 P. 345, 346 (1907), quoting Ex parte Maier, 37
P. 402 (Ca. 1894). See also Walbridge v. Robinson, 22 Idaho 236, 243, 125 P. 812, 814
(1912) ("wild animals [are] subject to the regulation and control of the state in its sovereign
capacity").
One of the seminal cases in American wildlife law, Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1917), established that the protection of wildlife is "a governmental function

for the benefit of the public at large, and no one can complain of the incidental injuries that
may result." Id. at 100. In short, the balancing of the economic consequences of wildlife
protection against the public benefits is a governmental function, not a proprietary function.
See State v. Thompson, 136 Idaho 322, 326, 33 P.3d 213, 217, (Ct. App. 2001) (citing
Barrett in support of conclusion that state is not generally liable for economic losses arising
from acts of wildlife).
The fact that bighorn sheep were once extirpated from Hells Canyon does not
transform their reintroduction into a proprietary function-their reintroduction is as much a
sovereign function as would be protection of native herds. See Moerman v. California, 21
Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 333 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that state's responsibility for actions of
reintroduced elk was same as for all other wild animals: "it is unreasonable to argue that
because the animals were once eliminated from Lake and Mendocino Counties and driven to
the brink of extinction, that they are now nothing more than a public improvement or pet,
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under the control of the state"). Given these background principles of state sovereignty over
wildlife, estoppel cannot be applied to inhibit IDFG in carrying out its statutory mandate to
preserve, protect, and perpetuate wildlife. Idaho Code § 36-103.
The second principle rendering estoppel inapplicable here establishes that state
officers cannot bind the state to promises or commitments that are not authorized by statute.
Applying estoppel in such circumstances would essentially "allow an administrative agency
to expand its own powers and effectively amend statutes without legislative action." Kelso
& Irwin, P.A. v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 138,997 P.2d 591, 599 (2000). Thus, when

a public contract is illegal and void for violation of law, "the court will leave the parties as it
finds them and refuse to enforce the contract. The contract cannot be treated as valid by
invoking waiver or estoppel." Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho
277, 287, 207 P.3d 1008, 10 18 (2009). This is particularly true for contracts by public
agencies purporting to incur financial obligations in contravention of constitutional
prohibitions. In Deer Creek Highway Dist. v. Doumecq Highway Dist., 37 Idaho 601, 218 P.
371 (1923), this Court examined a contract by two highway districts to construct a bridge.
Upon completion of construction, one highway district failed to pay its agreed-upon share of
costs, and the other brought suit to recover. 37 Idaho at 605, 218 P. at 371. The Court held
that the underlying contract was void for violation of Article 8, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution,
which prohibits governmental subdivisions from incurring indebtedness in excess of the
income and revenue available in the year of contracting, absent the assent of two-thirds of
qualified voters. Id. at 606, 218 P. at 372. The appellant highway district nonetheless argued
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that the respondent highway district was estopped from denying its obligation, "the theory
being that appellant relied upon the promise of respondent to pay its proportion of the cost of
construction, that respondent had benefitted and should be estopped to set up the illegality of
the contract as a defense." Id. at 607, 218 P. at 372.
The court rejected the application of estoppel, noting first the general principle that:
Highway districts are creatures of the statute, their powers are limited, persons
dealing with them are conclusively presumed to know the extent of their
powers, and one entering into contracts with them in excess of their powers
does so at his peril. They have only the powers expressed in the statute and
such as may be necessarily implied.
Id. Given the foreknowledge that governmental entities cannot contract in excess of their
authority, and the constitutional provision declaring the incurred indebtedness void, the Court
held that "[a]n estoppel can never be invoked in aid of contract which is expressly prohibited
by a constitutional or statutory provision." Id. at 609, 218 P. at 373, quoting School District
v. Twin Falls County, 30 Idaho 400, 164 P. 1174 (1917).
Likewise, in this case, estoppel cannot be invoked to enforce any alleged promise
made by IDFG to incur liability for economic losses suffered by Woolgrowers due to
modification of federal grazing rights. Not only was Woolgrowers on notice that IDFG
could only make commitments within the limits of its statutory authority, such a promise,
whether embodied in a formal contract or made in circumstances that would otherwise create
a situation for application of estoppel, would be prohibited by the laws prohibiting the
obligation of funds not yet appropriated and cannot be enforced by this Court.
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E.

The Amended Complaint Fails to State a Claim Showing Violation of IDFG's
Statutory Duties Regarding Bighorn Sheep Reintroduction.

1.

Woolgrowers assert that IDFG was required by Idaho Code § 36-106 to

protect domestic sheep operators from economic consequences arising from modification of
federal grazing permits, failed to do so, and therefore Woolgrowers are entitled to damages
for economic loss. R., p. 15. The Amended Complaint fails to state a claim of damages for
violation of the statute for, as a general matter, the award of damages against an agency for
failure to carry out a statutory duty is precluded. Idaho Code § 65-5270 provides that judicial
review of agency actions, including actions based on an "agency's ... failure to perform, any
duty placed on it by law," Idaho Code § 67-5201(3)(c), is to be governed by the
administrative procedure act ("lAP A"), Idaho Code chapter 52, title 67, unless another
provision of law is applicable to the particular matter.
Assuming (as did the district court, R., pp. 175-76) that Woolgrowers brought its
action within the time limits allowed by Idaho Code § 67-5273, the IAPA limits the remedy
for violation of statutory duties to a court order setting aside the agency action and
remanding for further proceedings.

Idaho Code § 67-5279.

No award of damages is

authorized. See University of Utah Hosp. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Payette County, 128 Idaho
517, 520, 915 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Ct. App. 1996) (courts lack statutory authority to enter
money judgments against agency in lAP A proceedings). Thus, even if Woolgrowers were
able to demonstrate that IDFG had violated a statutory duty relating to the reintroduction of
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bighorn sheep, the Woolgrowers' claim for damages

IS

foreclosed by the lAP A unless

specifically authorized by another statute.
2.

Woolgrowers have not identified any statutory provision explicitly authorizing

the award of damages against IDFG for failure to carry out statutory duties with regard to
bighorn sheep reintroduction.

Wool growers seek to avoid identifYing such authority by

asserting that the interpretation of Idaho Code § 36-106 is a factual issue to "be verified by
testimony of the relevant witnesses as well as the relevant legislative history." Appellants'
Brief at 16. Legislative intent, however, is not a factual issue, it is a "question of law over
which this Court exercises free review." Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 148 Idaho 427, 430,
224 P.3d 494, 497 (2009). Legislative intent is to be determined by reference to the plain
meaning of the words used in a statute, or, in the event of an ambiguity, by reference to "the
reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its
legislative history." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Legislative history is not a matter for factual development-it is the prerogative of
the legislature to determine what history should be kept of its proceedings, and the Court
takes judicial notice of the journals kept by the legislative bodies for the purpose of
ascertaining such intent. Idaho State Tax Comm'n v. Haener Bros., Inc., 121 Idaho 741, 743,
828 P.2d 304, 306 (1992). Woolgrowers' assertion that it must be allowed to demonstrate
legislative intent through testimony of legislators or other participants in the legislative
process was roundly rejected by this Court in Gillihan v. Gump, 140 Idaho 264, 268, 92 PJd
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514, 518 (2004) (plurality op.), where the Court refused to consider an affidavit of a
legislator in determining the intent of a statute. The Court reasoned that:
First, post-enactment statements of legislators are not part of the record of the
Legislative Assembly that are considered the contemporaneous "history" that
is appropriate for courts to consult. '" Second, a post-enactment statement
of an individual legislator represents the views-or, perhaps more accurately,
the recollections-of a single participant in the legislative process. Even
when the statements of in¢ividuallegislators are offered during the enactment
process, they are commonly viewed cautiously as evidence of the intentions of
the entire assembly. .,. Courts are all the more loath to determine the
intentions of the institution as a whole on the basis of isolated statements that
are generated after enactment, without any evidence that the other members of
the legislative body even were aware of them, much less that they agreed with
them.
Id. at 268-69, 92 P.3d at 518-19, quoting Salem Keizer Ass'n of Classified Employees v.
Salem Keizer Sch. Dist., 61 P.3d 970 (Or. App. 2003).6 See also In re Mexico Money
Transfer Litigation, 267 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that affidavits of legislators
setting forth their understanding of a statute's intent, "offered away from the legislative halls
and long after the law's enactment, are worthless"). Thus, there are no factual issues that
prohibit dismissal of claims alleging violation of Idaho Code § 36-106.
3.

IDFG's duty to mitigate the impacts of bighorn sheep reintroduction on

federal grazing permitees is set forth in plain and unambiguous language that is utterly at
odds with Woolgrowers' assertions that the legislature "mandated IDFG to protect domestic
sheep operators from economic harm" and "authorize [d] an award of damages against the

6 Gillihan was overturned on other grounds in Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879,231 PJd
524 (2009).
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State in the amount of economic harm sustained by the Woolgrowers." Appellants' Brief at
16.
From 1997 to 2009, IDFG's statutory duties with respect to domestic sheep operators
were set forth in Idaho Code § 36-106(e)(5)(D) as follows: IDFG was to provide notice to
grazing permittees before engaging in bighorn sheep transplants, provide a hearing if any
affected permittee expressed written concern, and join federal and state entities in sending a
"written letter" stating that the existing sheep operations were recognized and that the risk of
loss of bighorn sheep was accepted. 1997 Idaho Sess. Laws 863, 864-65.

7

That was the

extent of the duties imposed on IDFG.
There is nothing in the plain language of the 1997 legislation requiring IDFG to use
public funds to reimburse domestic sheep operators for economic losses in the event that
grazing permits were modified. Perhaps this is why Wool growers make no effort to identify
terms that may be construed as requiring reimbursement of Woolgrowers' losses, but instead
resort to crafting language that does not exist ("the context of the enactment and the plain
language of the statute itself ... mandated IDFG to protect domestic sheep operators from
economic harm"), and asserting that "[Woolgrowers] should have the right at trial ... to
elicit evidence regarding legislative intent." Appellants' Brief at 15-16.

7 As part of the 2009 amendments to Idaho Code § 36-106, the term "letter" was
changed to "agreement." 2009 Idaho Sess. Laws at 915. This change, however, was not
made retroactive to the 1997 Letter. See Hill v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 150 Idaho
619,628,249 P.3d 812, 821 (2011) ("[n]o statute is retroactive unless the Legislature
expressly declares that it is").
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The lack of any provision requiring IDFG to reimburse domestic sheep operators for
modification of grazing privileges is fatal to Woolgrowers' claims. If the legislature had
intended to reimburse domestic sheep operators from economic losses it would have spoken
plainly, as it has in other instances. For example, Idaho Code § 25-141D establishes the
"sheep and goat disease indemnity fund" and provides that money in the fund may be "used
to indemnifY owners whose animals or herds have been condemned or destroyed" at the
direction of the state board of sheep commissioners. Idaho Code § 25-141D. No analogous
authority for expenditures is found in Idaho Code § 36-106. The duty imposed on IDFG by
the 1997 legislation stopped with the sending of the letter stating that existing domestic sheep
operations are "recognized" and that the risk of disease transmission and loss of bighorn
sheep is "accepted." While such language accepts the risk that bighorn sheep may be lost, it
does not impose upon IDFG the risk that grazing privileges may be lost or otherwise require
reimbursement for such losses. This is confirmed by the requirement that the "letter" is to be
signed by all "federal, state and private entities responsible for the transplant." Since the
legislature had to understand that it could not impose upon federal agencies the obligation to
indemnifY domestic sheep operators from economic loss, the plain terms of the statute
likewise do not impose any such obligation upon IDFG.
4.

Woolgrowers' argument that the terms of Idaho Code § 36-106 require IDFG

to mitigate the modification of federal grazing privileges by reimbursing W 001 growers for
economic losses are further belied by the 2009 amendments to § 36-106, which set forth
explicitly the exclusive duty owed to Woolgrowers in the event bighorn sheep transplants
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create conflicts with grazing on "current federal or state domestic sheep grazing allotments."
Idaho Code § 36-1 06(e)(5)(E).

To help resolve such conflicts, IDFG is directed to

"cooperatively develop best management practices with the permittee(s)," and upon
implementation of the best management practices, "certify that the risk of disease
transmission, if any, between bighorn and domestic sheep is acceptable for the viability of
the bighorn sheep." Id.
It was not coincidental that the 2009 amendment occurred shortly after the federal

courts upheld the modification of the Shirts' and Shirts Brothers' federal grazing allotments
to protect bighorn sheep. Legislation must be construed "under the assumption that the
legislature knew of all legal precedent ... in existence at the time the statues were passed.
City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 150, 879 P.2d
1078, 1083 (1994). That was certainly the case here. The legislative history indicates that
the amendment had been "negotiated and agreed upon by the Governor's office, the Senate,
and the Shirts family'S attorney," and was intended to address "grazing on the Payette
National Forest lands." R., pp. 113-14 (House Res. & Cons. Comm. Minutes, April 29,
2009). Hence, the legislative history leaves no doubt that the legislature, being made aware
of modifications to the Shirts' grazing permits, chose to impose specific and limited
obligations upon IDFG to assist in resolving conflicts on federal grazing allotments. Under
the canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the legislature's designation
of specific duties in response to a specific problem implies the exclusion of things not
mentioned.

See, e.g., State v. Michael, 111 Idaho 930, 933, 729 P.2d 405, 408 (1986)
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("[w]hen a statute enumerates the areas that are to be encompassed in its enforcement, it is
generally accepted that those areas not specifically mentioned are not to be included [and] we
will not engraft additional terms into the language of [the statute],,).

Under the

circumstances, implying an obligation to reimburse domestic sheep operators for economic
losses would be completely at odds with the legislature'S directives.
In sum, Woolgrower's statutory claims must be dismissed as a matter of law:
legislative intent is readily discernable from the plain terms of the statute and the legislative
history, and Woolgrowers are not entitled to present any factual testimony or other evidence
to alter or complement legislative intent.
CONCLUSION

This Court should affirm the Judgment of the district court dismissing the Amended
Complaint for failure to state a claim, and award IDFG reasonable attorneys' fees and costs
on appeal for defending against issues with no reasonable basis in fact or law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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day of October 2011.

LAWRENCEG. WASDEN
Attorney General
Clive J. Strong
Division Chief, Natural Resources Division

~

STEVEN W. STRACK
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ADDENDA
1.

Letter from USDA Forest Service and other parties to Stan Boyd,
Executive Director, Idaho Wool growers Association,
January 16, 1997.

2.

1997 Idaho Session Laws 863 (amendments to Idaho Code § 36-106).

3.

Idaho Code § 36-106 (2011).
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U oiled States
Department of

Forest
Service

Wa llowa -Whi tmRn
National Forest

P. O. Box 907
Baker City, 0R

A.griculture

97814

----Rej}t~ Io

001,

2210
January 16, 1997

r

Idaho Woolgrowers Association
Mr. Stan Boyd, Executive Director
P. O. Box: 2596
Boise, 1D 83701
L

RECEIVED

MAR 1 1 1997
L W. G. A.

Dear Hr. Boyd:
The effort to transplant bighom sheep into historic habitat in Hells Canyon
is a cooperative project involving the States of Idaho, Oregon, and
\Ja.shington, The Foundation for North American Wild Sheep, the Forest
Service, and the Bureau of Land Hanagement. The Hells Canyon Bighorn Sheep
Restoration Committee (the co~nittee) is interested iA having the support of
the woolgro·.1("rs industry for this effort to repopulate parts of Hells Canyon
with biehorn sheep.
The Committee unders~ands that bighorns may occasionally migrate outside
of their designated range and come into contact with domestic sheep. These
bighorns will be considered "at risk" for potential disease transmission and
death. There is also the potential for an exposed bighorn Co leave the area
Ilnd sprelld disease to other bighorn sheep.
Under these condi.tions, the
Idaho D&pnrtment of Fish 'and Game, the Oregon Department of FiYh and
Wildlife, and the Washington Department of Wildlife will assume the
responsibility for bighorn losses and further disease trllnsmisAinn in their
respective states. The three Departments will also take whatever action is
n(~cessary to re,duce further losses of bighorn ~he(~r \·,Lt.lloll': ndversi.~ly
i.l11pacting e:d.'::ting domestic sheep oper,1tors.
The enc.losl?d lII .. p ~~lc;H'1y
dfdineates the project area \'litl1il1 the llells Canyon <.:on:pl.E'~:. lHghurns
~tr{".'i.ng. :into cttn:0.ntly active sheep allotments will be cOllsid(>n~d "at risk"
by all of the Committee entities. Tliis means that the Committee recognizes
the existing domestic sheep operations in or adjacent to the Hells Canyon
complex, on both National Forest and private lands, and accepts the
potential risl< of disease transmission and loss of bighorn slleep when
bighorns invade dom",.c;tic sheep opel:.::ttions.

FS·6200' IIIl (7

a Ii

~

Idaho Wool growers Association

2

The Committee will make every effort to keep interested parties informed
about actions being considered by ihe Committee ill its effort to repopulate
Hells Canyon with bighorn sheep. We will provide all health information
gathered on bi~lorn shdep to the woolgrowers industry and other interested
parties.
Sincerely,

~

USDA Forest Service, Wallowa-Whitman NF

--

{ c)--4--

Idaho Dept. of Fish and Game

Foundation for N. American Wild SheaD
...s::u A( ..f.".w,
.

Enc1os~lrer
cc:

Forest Supervisor, Payette NF
Forest Supervisor, Nez Perce NF

/bcuJ ~ /997
Date
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CHAPTER 284
(H.B. No. 337, As Amended)
AN ACT
RELATING TO TRANSPLANTS OF BIGHORN SHEEP; AMENDING SECTION 36-106,
IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE CONDITIONS PRECEDENT BEFORE THE FISH AND
GAME DIRECTOR CAN APPROVE ANY FUNDS OR TO TAKE ANY ACTION TO PROVIDE FOR THE TRANSPLANTS OF BIGHORN SHEEP INTO AREAS THEY DID NOT
INHABIT; AND DECLARING AN EMERGENCY.
It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
SECTION 1. That Section 36-106, Idaho Code, be, and the same 1S
hereby amended to read as follows:

36-106. DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME. (a) Office of
Created. The commission shall appoint a director of the
department of fish and game, hereinafter referred to as the director,
who shall be a person with knowledge of, and experience in, the
requirements for the protection, conservation, restoration, and management of the wildlife resources of the state. The director shall not
. hold any other public office, nor any office in any political party
organization, and shall devote his entire time to the service of the
state in the discharge of his official duties, under the direction of
. the commission.
(b) Secretary to Commission. The director or his designee shall
as secretary to the commission.
(c) Compensation and Expenses. The director shall receive such
~v'·lIvt:ll~ation as the commission, with the concurrence and
approval of
governor, may determine and shall be reimbursed at the rate provided by law for state employees for all actual and necessary traveland other expenses incurred by him· in the discharge of his official duties.
(d) Oath and Bond. Before entering upon the duties of his office,
director shall take and subscribe to the official oath of office,
provided by section 59-401, Idaho Code, and shall, in addition
eto, swear and affirm that he holds no other public office, nor
pos1t10n under any political committee or party. Such oath, or
irmation, shall be signed in the office of the secretary, of state.
The director shall be bonded to the state of Idaho in the time,
orm and manner prescribed by chapter 8, title 59, Idaho Code.
(e) Duties and Powers of Director.
1. The director shall have general supervision and control of all
activities, functions, and employees of the department of fish and
game, under the supervision and direction of the commission, and
shall enforce all the provisions of the laws of the state, and
rules and regulations of the commission relating to wild animals,
birds, and fish and, further, shall perform all the duties prescribed by section 67-2405, Idaho Code, and other laws of the
state not inconsistent with this act, and shall exercise all necessary powers incident thereto not specifically conferred on the
commi'ssion.
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2. The director is hereby authorized to appoint as many classified employees as the commission may deem necessary to perform
administrative duties, to enforce the laws and to properly implement '... management, propagation, and protection programs established
for carrying out the purposes of the Idaho fish and game code.
3. The appointment of such employees shall be made by the director in accordance with the Idaho personnel commission act and
rules promulgated pursuant to chapter 53, title 67, Idaho Code,
and they shall be compensated as provided therein. Said employees
shall be bonded to the state of Idaho in the time, form, and manner prescribed by ch~pter 8, title 59, Idaho Code.
4. The director is' '' hereby authorized to establish and maintain
fish hatcheries for the p~;:'Pbseof hatching, propagating, and distributing all kinds of fish.
5.
(A) The director, or any person appointed by him in wr1t1ng
to do so, may take wildlife of any kind, dead or alive, or
import the same, subject to such conditions, restrictions and
regulations as he may provide, for the purpose of inspection,
cultivation, propagation, distribution, scientific or other
purposes deemed by him to be of interest to the fish and game
resource of the state.
(B) The director shall have supervision over all of the matters pertaining to the inspection, cultivation, propagation
and distribution of the wildlife propagated under the provisions of title 36, Idaho Code. He shall also have the power
and authority to obtain, by purchase or otherwise, wildlife
of any kind or variety which he may deem most suitable for
distribution in the state and may have the same properly
cared for and distributed throughout the state of Idaho as he
may deem necessary.
(C) The
director
is
hereby
authorized
to issue a
licenseltag/permit to a nonresident landowner who resides 1n
a contiguous state for the purpose of taking one (1) animal
during an emergency depredation hunt which includes the
landowner's
I~aho
property subject to such conditions,
restrictions or regulations as the director may provide. The
fee for this license/tag/permit shall be equal to the costs
of a resident hunting license, a resident tag fee and a resident depredation permit.
(D) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 36-408, Idaho
Code, to the contrary, on and after the effective date of
this act, the director shall not expend any funds, or take .
any action, or authorize any employee or agent of the depart- ~
ment or other person to take any action, to undertake actual ..
transplants of bighorn sheep into areas they do not now '
inhabit or to augment the number of bighorn sheep in existing .
herds until:
(i)
The boards of county commissioners of the counties
in which the release is proposed to take place have been
given reasonable notice of the proposed release.
(ii) The affected federal and state land grazing per- ·
mittees and owners or leaseholders of private land in
or contiguous to the proposed release site have been
.1'. .
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given reasonable notice of the proposed release.
(iii) The president pro tempore of the senate and the
speaker of the house of representatives have received
from the director a plan for the forthcoming year that
details, to the best of the department's ability, the
proposed trar.splants which shall include the estimated
numbers of bighorn sheep to be transplanted and a
description of the areas the proposed transplant or
transplants are planned for.
Upon request, the department shall grant one (1) hearing
per transplant if any affected individual or entity expresses
written concern within ten (10) days of notification regarding any transplants of bighorn sheep and shall take into consideration these concerns in approving, modifying or canceling any proposed bighorn sheep transplant. Any such hearing
shall be held wit"hin thirty (30) days of the request. Upon
any transplant of bighorn sheep into areas they do not now
inhabit or a transplant to augment existing populations, the
department shall provide for any affected federal or state
land grazing permittees or owners or leaseholders of private
land a written letter signed by all federal, state and private entities responsible for the transplant stating that the
existing sheep or livestock operations in the area of any
such bighorn sheep transplant are recognized and that the
potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of
bighorn sheep when the same invade domestic livestock or
sheep operations is accepted.
(A) The director shall have the power, at any time when it
is desired to introduce any new species, or if at any time
any species of wildlife of the state of Idaho shall be
threatened with excessive shooting, trapping, or angling or
otherwise, to close any open season for such time as he may
designate; in the event an emergency is declared to exist
such closure shall become effective forthwith upon written
order of the director; in all other cases upon publication
and posting as provided in section 36~105, Idaho Code.
(B) In order to protect property from damage by wildlife,
the fish and game commission may delegate to the director or
his designee the authority to declare an open season upon
that particular species of wildlife to reduce its population.
The director or his designee shall make an order embodying
his findings in respect tO
o when, under what circumstances, in
which localities, by what means, and in what amounts, numbers
and sex the wildlife subject to the hunt may be taken. In the
event an emergency is declared to exist such open season
shall become effective forthwith upon written order of the
director or his designee; in all other cases upon publication
and posting as provided in section 36-105, Idaho Code.
(C) Any order issued under authority hereof shall be published in at least one (1) newspaper of general circulation
in the area affected by the order for at least once a week
for two (2) consecutive weeks, and such order shall be posted
in public places in each county as the director may direct.
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(D) During the closure of any open season or the opening of
any special depredation season by the director all prOV1Slons
of laws relating to the closed season or the special depredation season on such wildlife shall be in force and whoever
violates any of the provisions shall be subject to the penalties prescribed therefor.
(E) Prior to the opening of any special depredation hunt,
the director or his designee shall be authorized to provide
up to a maximum of fifty percent (50%) of the available permits for such big game to the landholder(s) of privately
owned land within the hunt area or his designees. If the
landholder(s) chooses to designate hunters, he must provide a
written list of the names of designated individuals to the
department. If the landholder(s) fails to designate licensed
hunters, then the department will issue the total available
permits in the manner set by rule. All hunters must have a
current hunting license and shall have equal access to both
public and private lands within the hunt boundaries. It shall
be unlawful for any landholder(s) to receive any form of compensation from a person who obtains or uses a depredation
controlled hunt permit.
7. The director shall make an annual report to the governor, the
legislature, and the secretary of state, of the doings and conditions of his office, which report shall be made in accordance with
section 67-2509, Idaho Code.
8. The director may sell or cause to be sold publications and
materials in accordance with section 59-1012, Idaho Code.
9. Any deer, elk, antelope, moose; bighorn sheep or bison
imported or transported by the department of fish and game shall
be tested for the presence of certain communicable diseases that
can be transmitted to domestic livestock. Those communicable diseases to be tested for shall be arrived at by mutual agreement
between the department of fish and game and the department of
agriculture. Any moneys expended by the department of fish and
game on wildlife disease research shall be mutually agreed upon by
the department of fish and game and the department of agriculture.
In addition, a comprehensive animal health program for all
deer, elk, antelope, moose, bighorn sheep, or bison imported into,
transported, or resident within the state of Idaho shall be implemented after said program is mutually agreed upon by the department of fish and game and the department of agriculture.
In order to enhance and protect the health of wildlife within
the state, as well as safeguard the health of livestock resources,
the director of the department of agriculture shall employ at
least one (1) veterinarian licensed in Idaho whose duties shall
include, but not be limited to, addressing wildlife disease issues
and coordinating disease prevention work between the department of
fish and game and the department of agriculture. The employing of
said veterinarian shall be by mutual agreement of the director of
the department of fish and game and of the director of the department of agriculture. The veterinarian shall be on the staff of the
division of animal industries, department of agriculture. The salary or compensation to be paid said veterinarian or veterinarians
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shall be divided equally between the department of fish and game
and the department of agriculture, and the department of fish and
game's portion shall be deposited directly into the livestock disease control account. The veterinarian shall be employed on and
after July 1, 1989.
10. In order to monitor and evaluate the disease status of wildlife and to protect Idaho's livestock resources, any suspicion by
fish and game personnel of a potential communicable disease process in wildlife shall be reported within twenty-four (24) hours to
the department of agriculture. All samples collected for disease
monitoring or disease evaluation of wildlife shall be submitted to
the division of animal industries, department of agriculture.
11. (A) The director is authorized to enter into an agreement
with an independent contractor for the purpose of providing a
telephone order and credit card payment service for controlled hunt permits, licenses, tags, and permits.
(B) The contractor may collect a fee for its service in an
amount to be set by contract.
(C) All moneys collected for the telephone orders of such
licenses, tags, and permits shall be and remain the property
of the state, and such moneys shall be directly deposited by
the contractor into the state treasurer's account in accordance with the provisions of section 59-1014, Idaho Code. The
contractor shall furnish a good and sufficient surety bond to
the state of Idaho in an amount sufficient to cover the
amount of the telephone orders and potential refunds.
(D) The refund of moneys for unsuccessful controlled hunt
permit applications and licenses, tags, and permits approved
by the department may be made by the contractor crediting the
applicant's or licensee's credit card account.
An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is
declared to exist, this act shall be in full force and effect
after its passage and approval.

March 24, 1997.

CHAPTER 285
(H.B. No. 345)
AN ACT
MONEYS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME FOR FISCAL
YEAR 1998; LIMITING THE NUMBER OF AUTHORIZED FULL-TIME POSITIONS;
PROVIDING LEGISLATIVE INTENT REGARDING THE IDAHO WILDLIFE MAGAZINE; AND AMENDING SECTION 36-112, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE THAT THE
STATE CONTROLLER SHALL TRANSFER AN ADDITIONAL FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS PER YEAR FROM THE FISH AND GAME ACCOUNT TO THE ANIMAL DAMAGE
CONTROL ACCOUNT TO BE USED FOR THREE YEARS TO FUND ANIMAL DAMAGE
CONTROL EFFORTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH RESEARCH PROJECTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF UPLAND GAME AND BIG GAME AND TO PROVIDE THAT UPON COMPLETION OF THE THREE YEAR PERIOD THE ADDITIONAL MONEYS TRANSFERRED
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Idaho Statutes
TITLE 36
FISH AND GAME
CHAPTER 1
FISH AND GAME COMMISSION
36-106. DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME. (a) Office of Director
Created. The commission shall appoint a director of the department of fish
and game, hereinafter referred to as the director, who shall be a person
with knowledge of, and experience in, the requirements for the protection,
conservation, restoration, and management of the wildlife resources of the
state. The director shall not hold any other public office, nor any office
in any political party organization, and shall devote his entire time to
the service of the state in the discharge of his official duties, under
the direction of the commission.
(b)
Secretary to Commission. The director or his designee shall serve
as secretary to the commission.
(c)
Compensation and Expenses.
The director shall receive such
compensation as the commission, with the concurrence and approval of the
governor, may determine and shall be reimbursed at the rate provided by
law for state employees for all actual and necessary traveling and other
expenses incurred by him in the discharge of his official duties.
(d)
Oath and Bond. Before entering upon the duties of his office, the
director shall take and subscribe to the official oath of office, as
provided by section 59-401, Idaho Code, and shall, in addition thereto,
swear and affirm that he holds no other public office, nor any position
under any political committee or party. Such oath, or affirmation, shall
be signed in the office of the secretary of state.
The director shall be bonded to the state of Idaho in the time, form
and manner prescribed by chapter 8, title 59, Idaho Code.
(e)
Duties and Powers of Director.
1.
The director shall have general supervision and control of all
acti vi ties, functions, and employees of the department of fish and
game, under the supervision and direction of the commission, and shall
enforce all the provisions of the laws of the state, and rules and
proclamations of the commission relating to wild animals, birds, and
fish and, further, shall perform all the duties prescribed by section
67-2405, Idaho Code, and other laws of the state not inconsistent with
this act, and shall exercise all necessary powers incident thereto not
specifically conferred on the commission.
2. The director is hereby authorized to appoint as many classified
employees
as
the
commission
may
deem
necessary
to
perform
administrative duties, to enforce the laws and to properly implement
management,
propagation,
and protection programs established for
carrying out the purposes of the Idaho fish and game code.
3. The appointment of such employees shall be made by the director in
accordance
with
chapter
53,
title
67,
Idaho
Code,
and rules
promulgated pursuant thereto,
and they shall be compensated as
provided therein. Said employees shall be bonded to the state of Idaho
in the time, form, and manner prescribed by chapter 8, title 59, Idaho

http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/idstatiTitle36/T3 6CH 1SECT3 6-1 06PrinterFriendly .htrn

10/1812011

Statutes

Page 2 of5

Code.
4. The director is hereby authorized to establish and maintain fish
hatcheries for the purpose of hatching, propagating, and distributing
all kinds of fish.
S.
(A) The director, or any person appointed by him in
writing to do so, may take wildlife of any kind, dead or alive,
or import the same, subject to such conditions, restrictions and
rules as he may provide,
for the purpose of inspection,
cultivation,
propagation,
distribution,
scientific or other
purposes deemed by him to be of interest to the fish and game
resources of the state.
(8)
The director shall have supervision over all of the matters
pertaining to the inspection,
cultivation,
propagation and
distribution of the wildlife propagated under the provisions of
title 36, Idaho Code. He shall also have the power and authority
to obtain, by purchase or otherwise, wildlife of any kind or
variety which he may deem most suitable for distribution in the
state and may have the same properly cared for and distributed
throughout the state of Idaho as he may deem necessary.
(C)
The
director
is
hereby
authorized
to
issue
a
license/tag/permi t to a nonresident landowner who resides in a
contiguous state for the purpose of taking one (1) animal during
an emergency depredation hunt which includes the landowner's
Idaho property subject to such conditions, restrictions or rules
as the director may provide. The fee for this license/tag/permit
shall be equal to the costs of a resident hunting license, a
resident tag fee and a resident depredation permit.
(0)
Unless relocation is required pursuant to subparagraph (E)
herein, notwithstanding the provisions of section 36-408, Idaho
Code, to the contrary, the director shall not expend any funds,
or take any action, or authorize any employee or agent of the
department or other person to take any action, to undertake
actual transplants of bighorn sheep into areas they do not now
inhabit for the purpose of augmenting existing populations until:
(i)
The boards of county commissioners of the counties in
which the release is proposed to take place have been given
reasonable notice of the proposed release.
(ii)
The affected federal and state land grazing permittees
and owners or leaseholders of private land in or contiguous
to the proposed release site have been given reasonable
notice of the proposed release.
(iii) The president pro tempore of the senate and the
speaker of the house of representatives have received from
the director a plan for the forthcoming year that details,
to the best of the department's ability, the proposed
transplants which shall include the estimated numbers of
bighorn sheep to be transplanted and a description of the
areas the proposed transplant or transplants are planned
for.
Upon request, the department shall grant one (1) hearing per
transplant or relocation if any affected individual or entity
expresses written concern within ten (10) days of notification
regarding any transplants or relocations of bighorn sheep and
shall take into consideration these concerns in approving,
modifying or canceling any proposed bighorn sheep transplant or
relocation. Any such hearing shall be held wi thin thirty (30)
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days of the request. It is the policy of the state of Idaho that
existing sheep or livestock operations in the area of any bighorn
sheep transplant or relocation are recognized and that the
potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and loss of
bighorn sheep when the same invade domestic livestock or sheep
operations is accepted. Prior to any transplant or relocation of
bighorn sheep into areas they do not now inhabit or a transplant
or relocation for the purpose of augmenting existing populations,
the department shall provide for any affected federal or state
land grazing permittees or owners or leaseholders of private land
a written agreement signed by all federal, state and private
enti ties responsible for the transplant or relocation stating
that the existing sheep or livestock operations in the area of
any such bighorn sheep transplant or relocation are recognized
and that the potential risk, if any, of disease transmission and
loss of bighorn sheep when the same invade domestic livestock or
sheep operations is accepted.
(E)
The Idaho department of fish and game: (1) shall develop a
state management plan to maintain a viable, self-sustaining
population of bighorn sheep in Idaho which shall consider as part
of the plan the current federal or state domestic sheep grazing
allotment (s) that currently have any bighorn sheep upon or in
proximity to the allotment(s); (2) within ninety (90) days of the
effective date of this act will cooperatively develop best
management practices with the permittee (s) on the allotment (s) .
Upon commencement of the implementation of best management
practices, the director shall certify that the risk of disease
transmission, if any, between bighorn and domestic sheep is
acceptable for the viability of the bighorn sheep. The director's
certification shall continue for as long as the best management
practices are implemented. The director may also certify that the
risk of disease transmission,
if any,
between bighorn and
domestic sheep is acceptable for the viability of the bighorn
sheep based upon a finding that other factors exist, including
but not limited to previous exposure to pathogens that make
separation between bighorn and domestic sheep unnecessary.
6.
(A) The director shall have the power, at any time when
it is desired to introduce any new species, or if at any time any
species of wildlife of the state of Idaho shall be threatened
wi th excessive shooting, trapping, or angling or otherwise, to
close any open season or to reduce the bag limit or possession
limit for such species for such time as he may designate; in the
event an emergency is declared to exist such closure shall become
effecti ve forthwith upon written order of the director; in all
other cases upon publication and posting as provided in section
36-105, Idaho Code.
(B)
In order to protect property from damage by wildlife, the
fish and game commission may delegate to the director or his
designee the authority to declare an open season upon that
particular species of wildlife to reduce its population. The
director or his designee shall make an order embodying his
findings in respect to when, under what circumstances, in which
localities, by what means, and in what amounts, numbers and sex
the wildlife subj ect to the hunt may be taken. In the everlt an
emergency is declared to exist such open season shall become
effective forthwith upon written order of the director or his
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designee; in all other cases upon publication and posting as
provided in section 36-105, Idaho Code.
(C)
Any season closure order issued under authority hereof shall
be published in at least one (1) newspaper of general circulation
in the area affected by the order for at least once a week for
two (2) consecutive weeks, and such order shall be posted in
public places in each county as the director may-direct.
(D)
During the closure of any open season or the opening of any
special depredation season by the director all provisions of laws
relating to the closed season or the special depredation season
on such wildlife shall be in force and whoever violates any of
the provisions shall be subject to the penalties prescribed
therefor.
(E)
Prior to the opening of any special depredation hunt, the
director or his designee shall be authorized to provide up to a
maximum of fifty percent (50%) of the available permits for such
big game to the landholder(s) of privately owned land within the
hunt area or his designees. If the landholder(s) chooses to
designate hunters, he must provide a written list of the names of
designated individuals to the department. If the landholder (s)
fails to designate licensed hunters, then the department will
issue the total available permits in the manner set by rule. All
hunters must have a current hunting license and shall have equal
access to both public and private lands within the hunt
boundaries. It shall be unlawful for any landholder(s) to receive
any form of compensation from a person who obtains or uses a
depredation controlled hunt permit.
7. The director shall make an annual report to the governor, the
legislature, and the secretary of state, of the doings and conditions
of his office, which report shall be made in accordance with section
67-2509, Idaho Code.
8. The director may sell or cause to be sold publications and
materials in accordance with section 59-1012, Idaho Code.
9. Any deer, elk, antelope, moose, bighorn sheep or bison imported or
transported by the department of fish and game shall be tested for the
presence of certain communicable diseases that can be transmitted to
domestic livestock. Those communicable diseases to be tested for shall
be arrived at by mutual agreement between the department of fish and
game and the department of agriculture. Any moneys expended by the
department of fish and game on wildlife disease research shall be
mutually agreed upon by the department of fish and game and the
department of agriculture.
In addition, a comprehensive animal health program for all deer,
elk,
antelope,
moose,
bighorn
sheep,
or bison
imported into,
transported,
or
resident within the
state
of
Idaho
shall
be
implemented after said program is mutually agreed upon by the
department of fish and game and the department of agriculture.
10. In order to monitor and evaluate the disease status of wildlife
and to protect Idaho's livestock resources, any suspicion by fish and
game personnel of a potential communicable disease process in wildlife
shall be reported within twenty-four (24) hours to the department of
agricul ture. All samples collected for disease monitoring or disease
evaluation of wildlife shall be submitted to the division of animal
industries, department of agriculture.
11.
(A)
The director is authorized to enter into an
agreement with an independent contractor for the purpose of
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providing a telephone order and credit card payment service
for controlled hunt permits, licenses, tags, and permits.
(B)
The contractor may collect a fee for its service in an
amount to be set by contract.
(C) All moneys collected for the telephone orders of such
licenses, tags, and permits shall be and remain the property of
the state, and such moneys shall be directly deposited by the
contractor into the state treasurer's account in accordance with
the provisions of section 59-1014, Idaho Code. The contractor
shall furnish a good and sufficient surety bond to the state of
Idaho in an amount sufficient to cover the amount of the
telephone orders and potential refunds.
(0)
The refund of moneys for unsuccessful controlled hunt permit
applications and licenses, tags, and permits approved by the
department
may be
made
by
the
contractor
crediting
the
applicant's or licensee's credit card account.
12. The director may define acti vi ties or facilities that primarily
provide a benefit: to the department; to a person; for personal use;
to a commercial enterprise; or for a commercial purpose.
The Idaho Code is made available on the Internet by the Idaho Legislatnre as a public service. This Internet version of the Idabo Code may not be used
for commercial purposes, nor may this database be published or repackaged for commercial sale without express written permission.

The Idaho Code is the property of the state of Idaho, and is copyrighted by Idaho law, Ie. § 9-352.
According to Idaho law, any person who reproduces or distributes the Idaho Code for commercial
purposes in violation of the provisions of this statute shall be deemed to be an infringer of the state of
Idaho IS copyright.
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